Human Rights Sanctions as Leverage: Argentina, A Case Study;Note by Berg, Gracia
Journal of Legislation
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 8
1-1-1980
Human Rights Sanctions as Leverage: Argentina, A
Case Study;Note
Gracia Berg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Berg, Gracia (1980) "Human Rights Sanctions as Leverage: Argentina, A Case Study;Note," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article
8.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol7/iss1/8
HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS AS LEVERAGE:
ARGENTINA, A CASE STUDY
INTRODUCTION
Congress has enacted amendments to existing foreign assistance legislation
to prohibit aid to a government which violates internationally recognized human
rights. One of the reasons these amendments, known as human rights sanctions,
have been enacted is to serve as leverage to force a government which violates
human rights to change its human rights policy. Because of the widespread
impact these amendments have had on American businessmen and United
States foreign relations, it is important to discuss the factors affecting the
effectiveness of the sanctions as leverage.
Congress first enacted human rights legislation I in 1974 as a reaction
against the "excessively pragmatic" foreign policies of the Nixon Administra-
tion2 and as a positive step toward a renewal of America's founding ideals.3
These efforts began in 1973 when Congressman Donald Fraser, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, held extensive hearings to examine the role of the
United States government in the protection of human rights. 4 Subsequently,
Congress has incorporated human rights concerns into educational pro-
grams, 5 hearings on foreign governments, 6 and resolutions denouncing
governments. 7
Inasmuch as Congress plays only a limited role in foreign relations, its
primary opportunity to affect human rights in other nations has been through
I. Pub. L. No. 94-161, Title III, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (1975) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(1976 and Supp. I 1977 & Pub. L. No. 96-53, § 504)).
2. See Fiscal Year 1980 International Security Assistance Authorization: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1979) (statement of Stanley J. Heginbotham)[hereinafter cited as 1980 Security Assistance]; Loescher, "Human Rights and the American Foreign
Policy: Executive-Legislative Interaction," 29 Jahrbuch des Offenlichen Rechtes 1 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Executive-Legislative Interaction]. See also: Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriations, 1978: Hearings before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10(1977) (statement of Clarence Long); 119 Cong. Rec. 30,900 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
3. The most often cited reason for human rights clauses is the American commitment to the image on
which it was founded. Statutory language which includes this goal: "in keeping with the constitutional
heritage and traditions of the United States" (22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1976)); "Avoid identification
of the United States, through such programs" (22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1976)). The congressional
committee which first proposed the human rights amendments said in their first report: "Respect of
human rights amendments is fundamental to the national tradition. It is expressed unequivocally in
the Constitution," House Subcomm. on Int'l. Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1974). A review of the history of human rights as a traditional American concern is given
in 123 Cong. Rec. Si1,122 (daily ed. June 29, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Proxmire).
4. International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations and the Role of
U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
5. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (1976) and 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(e) (Supp. I 1977).
6. See, e.g., Human Rights in Argentina: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Human Rights and
the Baltic States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
7. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 308, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 30,615 (1973) (denouncing Chile);
S. Res. 164, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. S6,137 (daily ed. May 17, 1979) (denouncing
Iran).
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foreign assistance appropriations. 8 Generally, the amendments have been worded
negatively to prohibit aid, however, in rare instances Congress has used foreign
aid as a positive incentive for nations to change their human rights pol-
icies.9
A principal reason for enacting the statutes is to apply leverage against a
violating nation to force it to change its domestic human rights policy. Equally
important, and perhaps more often articulated, is a second goal of disassociating
the United States from the human rights violators. 10
In discussing the human rights sanctions as leverage, Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs state that the sanctions have brought
about significant human rights improvements.'1 On the other hand, Henry R.
Geyelin, President of the Council of the Americas, 12 maintains that the policies
are "ineffective and even counterproductive."' 13 The Congressional Research
Service, in a recent study on the effect of human rights policies in fifteen
countries concluded that "the record on direct and explicit use of the foreign
assistance as leverage to bring about specific improvements in human rights
conditions is hardly encouraging." 14
This diversity of opinion is, in part, attributable to the varying interdependence
between individual foreign nations and the United States. As would be expected,
if a foreign country is dependent upon the United States aid and the United
States is not dependent on the foreign country, the policy is effective in
reducing violations. 15 If, however, the foreign country does not require the
8. Congress also has power to "advise and consent" the ratification of treaties. Presently they have not
acted on any of the major United Nations treaties. For a discussion of the issue, see: "The
International Human Rights Treaties: Some Problems of Policy and Its Interpretation," 126 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 886 (1978).
9. 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a) (Supp. I 1977) states that the United States shall -seek to "channel assistance
toward countries other than those whose governments engage in . . . " In application, aid has been
given "in anticipation of improvements in human rights conditions." See text between footnotes 52
and 54; Chile was allowed the Commodity Credit Corporation credits to reflect approval of "encouraging
political developments." Washington Star, May 5, 1978, A5. In 1977 Romania was extended
most-favored-nation status by the President on evidence that it has substantially eased emigration.
See: Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Status to Romania: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement of M. Nimitz),
reprinted in 77 Dep't. St. Bull. 278, 280-1 (1977).
10. Supra note 3.
11. Vance, "The Diplomacy of Human Rights: The First Year," reprinted in Dep't. St. Bull. 212 (Feb.
13, 1978). Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1980-81 (Part 7): Hearings before the
Subcomm. International Organization of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(statement of Mark L. Schneider) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Assistance 1980-81 ]. See also: Latin
America: Hearings before the Sucomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978) (statement of Thomas E. Skidmore) [hereinafter
cited as Latin America Hearings].
12. The Council of the Americas is a private, nonprofit association of over 200 United States corporations.
Member companies comprise nearly 90% of United States private investment in Latin America.
13. Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 52 (statement of Henry R. Geyelin). See also "Renewed
Controversy Over Argentina Human Rights Fails to Sway Government," Bus. Latin America 343,
Oct. 24, 1979.
14. 1980 Security Assistance, supra note 2, at 75 (prepared statement of Stanley J. Heginbotham).
15. Id., at 76: " . . . country that is interested in obtaining some form of benefit from the United States
makes an effort to improve its human rights conditions," Latin America Hearings, supra note 1I, at
78-9 (statement by Alexander Perry).
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assistance of the United States or if the United States is dependent upon the
foreign country,16 the sanctions will not be effective in bringing about a change
in the human rights policy of the violating nation.
The purpose of this note is to discuss some of the factors which are
relevant to the effectiveness of the human rights sanctions as leverage in
countries not dependent on United States aid. The legislation currently in force
will be reviewed and the present situation in Argentina will be studied to
provide background for a discussion of the sanctions' effectiveness. Argentina
has been chosen as a case study because it presents a situation in which the
United States has the option of exerting the full force of the sanctions because
the United States is not dependent on Argentina. This note will not attempt
to deal with the legality 17 or the morality of the sanctions, nor will it discuss
the effectiveness of the sanctions in attaining other goals such as promoting
the United States image.
LEGISLATION IN FORCE
A brief summary of foreign assistance legislation terms may be helpful in
understanding the sanctions. Foreign assistance legislation, as used herein,
includes all types of money, equipment and training that the United States
gives to another country. 18 Assistance is classified as security, economic or
financial. Security assistance includes grants and loans which transfer United
States arms, military training or economic support to a foreign nation for
national security reasons of either the receiving country or the United States.
Economic assistance includes grants or loans given to a foreign nation for
nonmilitary programs such as food, economic stabilization and general budgetary
support. Financial assistance includes loans, credits or guarantees given either
bilaterally or multilaterally. Bilateral financial assistance, which is aid given
directly by the United States to another nation, allows the United States to
retain full control over conditions governing the granting of such aid.
Multilateral financial assistance, which is aid given with other nations through
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, does not allow the
United States sole control over granting conditions; decisions on loans are
made by directors representing all member countries and the United States
has only one voice among many. 19
16. The United States may be dependent on a foreign nation, for example, for oil as in the case of Iran
or for military bases as in the case of the Philipines.
17. For a discussion of the legality of the sanctions, see Schacter, "International Law Implications of
United States Human Rights Policies," 24 N.Y.L.Sch. L. Rev. 63 (1977); Schwelb, "The International
Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter," 66 Am. J. Int'l. L. 337 (1972).
18. Loans are generally not considered "assistance" but will be included here because of the impact they
have on the effectiveness of the sanctions. Information used to explain foreign assistance legislation is
primarily derived from the foreign assistance statutes themselves and Center for Int'l. Policy, Human
Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program: Fiscal Year 1978, Part I-Latin America (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Latin America].
19. For example, the U.S. contributes 40% of the funds and has 23% of the votes at the World Bank.
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Congress has enacted human rights amendments to seven 20 of the United
States foreign assistance programs. Although these amendments vary in force
and scope, the most common, known as the Harkin Amendment, 21 states:
No assistance may be provided to any country the government of which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. 22
The annual human rights reports mandated by Congress deal with three
categories of rights including respect for the integrity of the person; governmental
policies relating to such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education;
and respect for civil and political liberties. 23 The type of abuse sought to be
prevented can be subdivided into specific requirements: there must be a
consistent pattern of violations and not an isolated act of atrocity; the violation
must be gross or extreme, not minor or insignificant; and it must be a violation
of an internationally recognized human right, that is, one which is recognized
by virtually all governments, by the United Nations in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declaration. 24 An example of
the types of violations is given in 22 U.S.C. § 2304:
• . . torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of the person.25
A reporting system is required under five26 of the seven statutes to determine
which countries seeking foreign assistance violate human rights as defined
above. These reports are prepared by the State Department as a part of the
annual proposal to Congress for foreign assistance appropriations.
Once it has been determined that a country is a violator of human rights,
aid will automatically be terminated unless the country comes under one of
the exception clauses. The exception clause for security aid provides assistance
if there are "extraordinary circumstances certified by the President" (of the
20. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976 and Supp. I 1977 and amend. of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-53 § 511
(to be codified in 22 U.S.C. § 2304(e)); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1976 and Supp. I 1977 and amend. of
Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-53 § 504 (to be codified in 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d); 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 635(b)(1)(B) (1979); 22 U.S.C.A. § 2199(1) (1979); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1712 (1979); 22 U.S.C. § 262d
(Supp. I 1977); 22 U.S.C.A. § 286-10 (1979).
21. Representative Thomas Harkin introduced the first of these amendments and has been instrumental
in the passage of the majority of the human rights amendments.
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1976).
23. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, Report to House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs and Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (hereinafter
cited as Country Report for 1979].
24. The United States has been widely criticized for promoting a Western view of human rights, i.e., civil
and political rights. Although the United States is concerned with these rights, their primary emphasis
has been on the integrity of the person. At the hearings of the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance
of the Senate in March 1977, it was said: "We must also take care that we do not impose United
States values in raising the issues of human rights." Human Rights Issues and Their Relationship to
Foreign Assistance Programs: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977). Vance, "Human Rights and Foreign
Policy," 7 Ga. J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 227 (1977).
25. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1) (1979).
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b),(c) (Supp. 1 1977); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (Supp. 1 1977); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1712(d)
(1979); 22 U.S.C.A. § 2863-10 (1979); 22 U.S.C. § 262d(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
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United States) 27 or "it is in the national interest of the United States." 28 The
exception clause for economic and financial aid states that aid will be given
if the aid will "directly benefit the needy people" of the recipient nation.29
Congress has also enacted human rights sanctions which cut off aid to
specific countries. 30 These amendments do not allow for any discretion in
determining if a country has violated human rights or if the aid will meet
the exception clause.
Charts I and II more fully explain the human rights sanctions. Chart I
defines the types of foreign assistance programs under the general categories
of security, economic and financial aid. Chart 11 gives the wording, exceptions,
legislative history, criteria for determination of violations and reporting systems
of each of the seven statutes which govern human rights sanctions.
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
STATUTES TO ARGENTINA
Argentina As Model
Sanctions may realistically be expected to be effective only if either the
violating country is economically dependent on the sanctioning country 31 or if
the sanctioning country is willing to rigorously apply the sanctions because it
is not dependent on the violating country. Argentina provides a case study of
a country upon which the United States is not dependent. 32 There are five
reasons for using Argentina as a model.
First, Argentina is structured as a democracy. 33 The Constitution in-
corporates guarantees of individual rights similar to those in the United States
Constitution.34 The primary difference between the Argentina and the United
States Constitution is that these rights may be suspended in Argentina when
there is a "state of seige. ' ' 35 Unlike the situation in Asia or Africa where new
systems of government are being created, Argentina is being urged to return
to its rule of law and basic democratic values. 36
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976).
28. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2199(1) (1979).
29. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b) (1976); 22 U.S.C. § 262d (Supp. I 1977); 22 U.S.C.A. § 2199(1) (1979); 7
U.S.C.A. § 1712 (1979).
30. 22 U.S.C.A. § § 2372 and 2372a (1979) (prohibition of aid to Argentina); 22 U.S.C. § 262d(b)(4)
(Supp. 1 1977) (prohibition of aid to Vietnam).
31. Supra note 15.
32. Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 79 (statement by Alexander Perry, Jr.).
33. Constitution of the Republic of Argentina (1853, amended 1860, 1866, 1898 and 1957) as published
in English translation by the General Secretariat, Organization of American States (Washington, D.C.
1978).
34. Id.; See e.g., Article 14 (freedom of press, religion, teaching and learning; equal pay for equal work,
right of labor unions to strike); Article 15 (slavery abolished); Article 16 (all inhabitants equal before
the law); and Article 18 (no ex post facto laws; no self-incrimination; right of defense by trial).
35. Id.; Article 23 provides: "In the event of internal disorder or foreign attack endangering the operation
of this Constitution and of the authorities created thereby, the Province or territory in which the
disturbance of order exists shall be declared in a state of siege and the constitutional guarantees shall
be suspended therein . .." A "state of seige" has been in effect since the military coup of 1976.
36. Argentina is a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966).
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Second, Argentina is advanced in socioeconomic development. 37 This
allows the attention of the United States to be focused on upholding the
integrity of the person rather than in the costly problems of alleviating
subsistence conditions.
Third, Argentina is not strategically necessary to the United States.38 Amer-
ica may impose sanctions without immediate concern for the United States
defense commitments or national security.
Fourth, the United States has maximum bilateral access to Argentina.
There is a close, long-standing relationship with Argentina as well as other
Latin American governments as reflected in the extensive network of economic,
military and political arrangements with the United States.39
Fifth, the United States has greater multilateral influence in Argentina
than in countries outside the Western Hemisphere. In addition to the pressure
the United States can exert through the international financial institutions, the
United States may also speak out against human rights violations in the forum
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Organization
of American States General Assembly.40 The United States also holds the
controlling vote on special operations in the Inter-American Development
Bank.41
Human Rights in Argentina
Violations of human rights in Argentina have been consistently reported
since the military junta took power in 1976. The annual report to Congress
in that year stated that:
The right of life, liberty and security of person are violated regularly by
terrorists at both ends of the political spectrum . . . [the] administration [has)
looked the other way with regard to violations attributable to persons associated
with the government. Right wing terrorism or counter-terrorism has been
carried out by vigilante squads operating with apparent impunity. Leftist
terrorism continues and has been responsible for hundreds of political
assassinations and kidnappings. 42
37. Argentina is listed in the Upper Middle Income group of the "World Socio-Economic Situation in
1976," Appendix II, Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid: Report to
the Comm. on Foreign Relations and House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 670
(1979). See also: U.S. Dep't of State and U.S. Foreign Service, Foreign Economic Trends and Their
Implications for the U.S.: Argentina (No. 102) (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Economic
Trends].
38. The Philippines and Korea are two examples of countries considered strategically necessary to the
national security of the United States. Aid to those countries has continued despite human rights
violations. Argentina does not present any assertion of strategic interest. See: Foreign Assistance
Authorizations: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Subcomm. on Foreign
Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
39. Latin American Hearings, supra note 11, at 25 (prepared statement of Thomas E. Skidmore).
40. Foreign Assistance 1980-81, supra note 11, at 126-7 (prepared statement of Hon. Gale McGee, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States).
41. Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report 1978 7 (1978).
42. Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid: Report to the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations and the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
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Amnesty International, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights in
Argentina and other groups have consistently protested the situation in Argen-
tina.43 The recent State Department report discusses the most often cited
problems: " . . . unexplained disappearances of [from] 6,500 ... [up to] 20,000
persons .. . substantial evidence that most of these persons were abducted
by the security forces and interrogated under torture; as most have not
reappeared, many observers believe that they were summarily executed." 44 Al-
though the State Department also noted some improvements in the situation
in the report, it is unclear what this means. 45 Amnesty International does not
believe that the present situation in Argentina reflects an improvement in the
human rights policies of the government:
The critical factor to examine in determining whether the situation of human
rights has improved is the overall structure of repression and whether any
effort has been made to dismantle that structure. In the case of Argentina,
(Amnesty International) is aware of no effort by the current regime to
investigate the whereabouts of the anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 people
who have disappeared, to take judicial action against those who were responsible
for these disappearances and to make clear and unequivocal statements that
such disappearances, torture, and summary executions will not be tolerated in
the future. In the absence of such action ...it is fair to say that there has
been no significant improvement in the overall human rights situation in
Argentina.46
The gross and consistent violations of internationally recognized human
rights which have taken place in Argentina have made it a prime target for
human rights sanctions by the United States.
Withdrawal of United States Aid to Argentina
Responding to the above conditions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
withdrew approximately one-half the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) appropriated
to Argentina (fifteen million dollars) in February, 1977. The committee also
directed the preparation of a plan to phase out military training programs for
43. See Report of the Mission of Lawyers to Argentina April 1-7, 1979, preprinted from 34 The Record
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1979); International League for Human
Rights Annual Review 1976-77, 5 (1977); Argentina League for the Rights of the People, "Mobilization
for Solidarity," 35 Guild Practitioner 5 (1976); "Resolution of OAS," Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1979
at AS; Nov. 1976 Amnesty International Report on Argentina and the Argentina Commission for
Human Rights letter to Carter, reprinted in 123 Cong. Rec. 9,890, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 125
Cong. Rec. S3,372-9 (daily ed. March 26, 1979) (statements by Sen. Kennedy, Amnesty International,
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Human Rights Office of the National Council of Churches, Washington
Office on Latin America).
44. Country Reports for 1979, supra note 23, at 239.
45. See text between footnotes 52 and 54 and between 71 and 72.
46. Letter from Larry Cox, Amnesty International, U.S.A. to author (February 26, 1980) (on file with
Journal of Legislation). In The Council on Hemisphere Affairs Annual Report, 1979, they state that
"Argentina is Latin America's worst human rights violator."
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Argentina in fiscal year 1979. Argentina reacted by rejecting any FMS
contingent on human rights including the fifteen million dollars offered for
fiscal year 1978. It did, however, accept funds not attached to human rights
clauses: fifty-four million dollars unexpended FMS from previous years, 700,000
dollars for Military Education and Training, cash sales and advisors.47
In addition, Argentina rejected any economic aid. This served only as a
symbolic gesture since Argentina received its last grant from the Agency for
International Development (AID) six years earlier, in 1971, and it has never
been eligible for Food for Peace grants.48 However, this symbolic gesture was
important because it marked the deterioration in bilateral relations between
the United States and Argentina. 49 Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator
Frank Church felt that the human rights violations in Argentina warranted
further sanctions and therefore on June 15, 1977, they introduced an amendment
to stop all military aid to Argentina. 50 This amendment included within its
ban all Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training
and commercial sales by private corporations. Although there were strong
denunciations of the Argentinian regime, the amendment was revised to postpone
the cut-off until September 30, 1978. The Amendment was later expanded to
prohibit aid for Peacekeeping Operations in 1978.51 The impact of this large
cut-off was modified by allowing renewal of all licenses for military exports
which were in effect before September, 1978.52
In July, 1978, the Export-Import Bank of the United States denied credits
to Argentina because of human rights violations. 53 This credit was for the
purchase of 270 million dollars worth of turbine engines manufactured by
Allis-Chalmers, a private United States corporation, for a dam on the Parana
River between Argentina and Paraguay. Because of an uproar among the
business community in the United States over this incident, the loan was
reinstated "in anticipation of human rights improvements." 54
FACTORS AFFECTING LEVERAGE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS SANCTIONS
Determing future human rights policy requires an understanding of the
factors affecting the leverage of human rights sanctions. There are three areas
47. Human Rights Conditions in Selected Countries and the U.S. Response: Report for Subcomm. on
International Organizations of the House International Relations Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1978).
48. Argentina is not eligible to receive Food for Peace grants since it exports food itself.
49. Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Organizations
of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1979) (prepared statement of Stanley
J. Heginbotham) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Policy].
50. 123 Cong. Rec. S9891-4 (daily ed. June 15, 1977) 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (remarks by Sen. Kennedy
and Sen. Church).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-384, 12(c)(1), 92 Stat. 737 (1978) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2372 (1979).
52. 22 U.S.C. § 237a (1976).
53. The Export-Import Bank of the United States Annual Report, 1978.
54. "Human Rights Zeal that Costs U.S. Jobs," Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1978: A23. "U.S. Lifts Objections
on Argentina Credit," Wash. Star, Sept. 30, 1978: A3.
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which merit discussion: (1) the human rights amendments are not comprehensive
and thereby allow a violating country to exploit, loopholes; (2) the United
States private sector is neither constrained by the statutes nor motivated by
the policies to discontinue its business relations with the violators; and (3)
other nations continue to provide the sanctioned items either through multilateral
institutions or as individual nations.
Loopholes in United States Government Aid
The United States government itself may continue to provide funds to
violating nations either through programs not covered by the statutes or through
loopholes in the statutes.
1. Programs Not Covered by Statutes
The Export-Import Bank of the United States, a government credit agency
whose purpose is to facilitate export of United States goods, was until recently,
covered under a human rights sanction. 55 There were efforts made to apply a
"Harkin Amendment" to this aid, but these were defeated 56 because of pres-
sure from the business community in the wake of the Allis-Chalmers in-
cident, 57 noted above. Instead, Congress repealed the provision in force and
replaced it with the milder language of the present statute: "Nonfinancial or
noncommercial considerations will be used only when they clearly and importantly
advance U.S. policy .. . in human rights. ' 58 The argument advanced by those
in favor of the current wording was that the primary purpose of the Export-Import
Bank is to finance and facilitate exports and therefore the first consider-
ation must be the trade objections and the balance of payments of the United
States.59 The realistic effect of the Export-Import Amendment is the same as
programs not covered by human rights sanctions.
There are also financial assistance programs which are not governed by
any human rights amendments. The Inter-American Foundation, 60 the Inter-
national Narcotics Control6' and most export licenses 62 are examples of
programs which offered aid not conditioned on the human rights situation.
55. Pub. L. No. 95-143 2, 91 Stat. 1210 (1977) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 635 (Supp. I 1977))
"and shall take into account the observance of the respect for human rights in the country to receive
the exports supported by a loan or financial guarantee and the effect such export may have."
56. H.R. No. 6415, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H10,998 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1977); 123 Cong.
Rec. H3,914-20 (daily ed. May 3, 1977).
57. See text between footnotes 52 and 54 and supra note 54.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1979).
59. H.R. Rep. No. 235, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 reprinted in 11977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3129.
60. 22 U.S.C. § 290f (1976).
61. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1976).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1976) (Presidental authority to extend preferences); 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976)(Foreign Trade Agreement) and 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976) (Arm Export Control Act) Items not on
the Munitions List. See also: Pres. Proc. No. 4694, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,671 (1979) (reduced rates of
duty on products to Argentina).
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2. Discretionary Provisions of the Human Rights Statutes
The human rights amendments for security and economic aid have never
been used directly to withdraw United States assistance, as of 1979,63 because
of the discretionery provisions of the statutes. The State Department has
discretion over whether or not it characterizes a country as a human rights
violator in its annual report to Congress. There is also discretion allowed in
determining if a proposed program comes within one of the exception clauses
and therefore may continue.
Since aid is only forbidden to a violating nation, the State Department
reports of human rights conditions required under the statutes becomes crucial
to the effectiveness of the sanctions.64 Five of the seven human rights statutes
require an annual reporting system 65 and the security aid statute provides for
an additional report within thirty days of a request by a Congressman. 66 The
first report that was prepared by the State Department for Congress was a
two page report stating that it was satisfied that those countries receiving
economic aid had complied with the requirements of human rights sanc-
tion.67 Dissatisfied with this response, Congress has enacted progressively stricter
requirements for comprehensive reports. 68
Even though there is input from organizations outside the State Depart-
ment such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists, 69 the ultimate responsibility for preparing the reports remains with the
State Department. The bulk of the report is prepared by the Embassies in
each country and by the Regional Bureaus. This presents an inherent conflict:
the same person charged with developing open communication and good bilateral
relations with the foreign country is expected to candidly and publicly review
all negative factors. 70 The result has often been a phenomenon called "clientism"
in which the Foreign Service Officers minimize the shortcomings and exaggerate
the virtues of the country to which they are assigned. 71
63. Congressional Research Service, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Experiences and Issues
in Policy Implementation" at 11 (1979)(unpublished report for the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.).
64. Claude, "Reliable Information: the Threshold Problem for Human Rights Research," 6 Human Rights
169 (1977).
65. Supra note 26.
66. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1976).
67. Report to the Congress on Human Rights Situations in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance;
Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. and House International Relations Comm. 94th
Cong., 1st Sess (1975).
68. Chart II spells out the current statutory requirements.
69. Under the statutes, one of the criteria used in determining whether a country is in gross violation is
its cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, groups from the United Nations
and the Organization of American States. The annual report to Congress states that "the reports draw
on information . . . from published reports of international non-governmental organizations engaged
in human rights activities and public actions and reports of human rights bodies of international
governmental organizations." Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid:
Report to the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
70. 1980 Security Assistance, supra note 2, at 73 (1979) (statement by Stanley J. Heginbotham).
71. Id.
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The most recent State Department report has been criticized for biased
reporting for the sake of bilateral relations in the case of Argentina:
Argentina ...has been criticized by many rights organizations but . . . is
being wooed by Washington to support the partial grain embargo against the
Soviet Union.
Some U.S. officials reportedly sought to go easy on Argentina's military
regime as a means of helping to gain this support.72
Once a nation is found to be a violator of human rights, 73 it may still re-
ceive United States government aid by demonstrating that the aid will benefit
the needy 74 of the violating country or that providing aid will be in the national
interest of the United States. 75 An Inter-Agency Committee76 has been set up
to make some of these determinations. This high level decision making body
consists of representatives of all the United States government organizations
that are involved in foreign assistance such as Agency for International
Development (AID), the directors of each of the international banks and the
Department of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA). The function
of this committee is to make the final determination as to whether aid should
be given.
Although the Inter-Agency Committee has now articulated some of the
principles on which they make their decisions, 77 there are still criticisms that
the important decisions do not appear to be made on the basis of any formulated
principles. 78 The Congressional Research Service notes that, "each case seem[s]
to be reviewed on its merits, and individual decisions [do] not seem to produce
principles on which subsequent cases could be decided. The result is that
decisions have been made that are hard to explain under the applicable statutory
provisions." '79 For example, in 1979, AID gave 215.2 million dollars to twelve
countries designated as human rights violators. Of this, 62.3% or 134.1 million
dollars went towards programs which appear to benefit the needy while 37.6%
or 81.1 million dollars did not go to the needy, but rather went toward expenses
not part of the exception clause: administrative needs, feasibility studies, office
equipment and payments to government officials. The World Bank gave loans
in 1979 to eighteen countries designated as human rights violators. Of this,
45% went for projects for the needy such as agriculture, health, education and
light capital projects while 55% went for projects that did not directly benefit
the needy, such as industry infrastructure and balance-of-payments loans. 80
72. "State Dept. Cites Rights Abuses by Rivals and Allies," Wash. Post, February 6, 1980: Al and A13.
73. The Committee report on Pub. L 94-161 noted that the President is reluctant to make such a
determination. [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1679, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
74. Supra note 29.
75. Supra note 28.
76. Committee is chaired by Warren Christopher, deputy Secretary of State and is commonly referred to
as the Christopher Committee.
77. Guidelines developed by the Christopher Committee: First, primary consideration is given to violations
of personal rights rather than to abuses of economic or political rights. Second, foreign assistance is
combined with a full range of diplomatic approaches. Third, assistance which directly benefits the
needy is approved. Fourth, only compelling national security reasons justifies security assistance to
countries with serious human rights problems. If aid is provided to these countries, sales to the police
or others involved in human rights abuses are restricted. Fifth, decisions are based on trends in human
rights conditions as well as the overall level of performance. Foreign Policy, supra note 49, at 23-5.
78. Foreign Policy, supra note 49, at 52 (statement by Stanley J. Heginbotham).
79. 1980 Security Assistance, supra note 2, at 73 (1979).
80. Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 57.
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Business Relations with the Private Sector
United States government policy can only have a partial effect on relations
with other countries because of the extensive United States citizen contact
with foreign governments, 8' including Argentina, through transnational
corporations, banks and export-import transactions.
Although the business community expresses concern for human rights, it
does not share the government's motivation for effectuating change. The business
communities' motivation is for profit, a fact inherent in a capitalist system.
1. Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporate interests are often seen as being in direct conflict
with human rights goals. Most transnational corporations 82 do not feel that
their interests conflict with human rights goals, but adopt General Motors'
position that a profitable business contributes to the material well-being of the
people in the host foreign nation.83 A United Nations' study on the effect of
transnationals on human rights states: "transnational investors want low wages
and stable trade unions which repressive regimes are best able to provide."
Foreign investors . . . "translate the transgression of these human rights into
increased profitability. ' 84 Argentina, for example, has enacted a highly restrictive
labor law which prohibits unions from political activity and serves to fragment
union organizations. The law allows up to ten years imprisonment for union
activity.8 5 This results in lower wages which in turn provides a desirable
environment for transnational corporate expansion. 86
2. Banks
Commercial lending sources have concerns similar to transnational corporations
when they seek creditworthy customers. The United Nations study states: "a
list of loans, and the banks making the loans indicates that banks prefer to
provide loans to authoritarian regimes."' 87 The effect of these large scale private
loans is that a violating country can avoid the pressure that sanctions would
otherwise provide.
Exact statistics on the relations of United States private banks with foreign
countries are difficult to compute because they must be compiled from diverse
81. Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 23.
82. Transnational corporation is defined as enterprises which own or control production or service facilities
outside the country in which they are based. They can be co-operatives or state-owned entities as well
as corporations or private.
83. Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human Rights in
Chile, 31 Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Probition of Minorities (provisional Agenda
Item 13) 390 U.N. Doc. p/CN4/Sub. 2/412 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UN Impact Study].
Contra. R. Mueller, Global Reach: the Power of the Multilateral Corporation 172 et seq. (1974).
84. UN Impact Study, supra note 83, at 423-4.
85. Some of the changes taken in Argentina include: 1) Prohibiting strikes; 2) Punishment of up to ten
years imprisonment for union activity; 3) Military personnel placed in some factories to "increase
productivity;" 4) Infantry corps present in industrial plant to oppose workers opposition; and 5) Longer
work week in disregard of Provincial laws which placed work week at 44 hours. Argentina Information
Service Comm., Argentina Today: A Dossier on Repression and the Violation of Human Rights 3,
8 (undated).
86. Real wages have fallen by 50% in two years in Argentina. "The Long Night of the Generals," 13
NACLA Report of the Americas 21, 24-5 (1979).
87. UN Impact Study, supra note 83, at 379-82.
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sources. However, the trend toward large private investments in Argentina
since the withdrawal of government aid can be determined from the following
facts: The North American Committee on Latin America (NACLA) reports
that private United States banks lent Argentina over forty-six million dollars
from 1977, when the sanctions were imposed, until the early part of 1978.88
Argentina itself claims that it expects credit to remain readily available and
that local credit costs are falling off as a result of stiff competition from
foreign lenders.89 The United States Commerce Department also concludes that
United States commercial banks are eager to supply credits to Argentina now
that its huge and rapidly growing foreign exchange reserves have established
it as a very creditworthy customer. 90
3. Export-Import Relations
Many United States firms have protested against the adverse impact a
direct loss of sales has on their business as in the case of Allis-Chalmers,
noted above.91 Their main concern, however, is the direct change in the economic
climate from confidence in the United States as their primary supplier to
mistrust and dissatisfaction. The American Association of Chambers of Commerce
in Argentina states that Argentina considers the United States unreliable as
a supplier and, rather than be embarrassed by human rights considerations,
will look elsewhere for suppliers. Once other nations begin to sell to Argentina,
United States businessmen are concerned that other countries will continue to
sell to Argentina and that the impact will be felt twenty years from now as
substantial export opportunities are diverted to foreign competitors. 92
The cumulative evidence indicates that the United States is Argentina's
largest single trading partner but competition from other nations is increasing.
Argentina's exports to the United States have risen from 16.5% in 1975 to
21.3% in 1978. Argentina's imports from the United States have increased
80.1% over the last five years, while Argentina's imports from the European
Economic Community countries are up 105.6%.93
Aid From Other Nations
1. International Financial Institutions
Multilateral lending agencies, more commonly known as International
Financial Institutions (IFI), further erode the pressure that the United States
might place on a violating government in two distinct ways. The IFIs supply
funds which the United States has refused through bilateral channels. Further,
the IFIs condition the granting of these needed funds on economic practices
which are often achieved through the imposition of conditions adverse to human
rights.
88. "Foreign Loans to Argentina and Argentine Firms Since the Military Coup of March 1976," NACLA
Reprt 27 (July/August 1978).
89. "The 1980 Business Outlook: A Rundown of the LAFTA Countries," Bus. Latin America, January
2, 1980 at 4.
90. Foreign Economic Trends, supra note 37, at 10.
91. Supra note 54.
92. Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 55 and 77.
93. Foreign Economic Trends, supra note 37 at 9-10. See Bus. Latin America, Dec. 19, 1979 at 406-7.
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Decisions on loans through the International Financial Institutions are made
by a vote of the Board of Directors of each lending institution. Although the
United States supplies a large percentage of the funds, it does not have a
controlling vote. The United States voting individually against a loan can have
no effect since it has, for example, only 23% of the vote at the World
Bank 94 and 28.42% of the vote at the Inter-American Development Bank.95 When
the aid given through bilateral sources is cut off, Argentina turns to the
multilateral sources and despite United States attempts to block the monies,
obtains the needed funds. For example, in 1974 the amount of funds that
Argentina received from bilateral and multilateral sources was approximately
the same. In 1976 when the United States withdrew bilateral aid, funds from
the multilateral sources almost doubled.96
The situation is changing as other countries vote with the United States
against loans to countries who violate human rights.97 Since the human rights
amendment was attached to the International Financial Institution Statute98 the
United States has opposed over forty-eight loans to fifteen countries on human
rights grounds. Other countries have voted similarly on twenty-five loans to
five governments. As a result, a half dozen loans have been withdrawn from
consideration.99
The United States has voted adversely on thirteen loans to Argentina for
human rights reasons from June, 1977 to December, 1978: three "no" votes
and ten abstentions. 100 It is not clear, however, which loans have been granted
to Argentina over the opposition of the United States.
The International Financial Institutions also erode United States pressure
by requiring only economic considerations in the granting of loans.10' In
order to obtain a loan, a country must be "creditworthy," i.e., it must have,
for example, a favorable balance of payments, a reduction of public expenditure
and imposition of wage controls.' 0 2 In Argentina, the freeze on wages imposed
under these economic policies has meant a decrease in the real wages of
Argentinians by fifty percent in only two years. 10 3 Representative Thomas
Harkin states that these conservative policies are often "enforced by repres-
94. World Bank Annual Report 1978 (1978).
95. Id. at Appendix E 164.
96. See Annual Reports for the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary
Fund, Export-Import Bank for the years 1974 through 1979. In 1978 and 1979 the total amount of
multilateral aid decreased because Argentina was no longer requesting aid from the International
Monetary Fund; Argentina's balance of payments had improved so that it no longer needed the funds.
97. Executive-Legislative Interaction, supra note 2, at 38.
98. 22 U.S.C. § 262d (Supp. I 1977).
99. Foreign Assistance 1980-81, supra note 11, at 8.
100. Id. at 15.
101. Supra note 94.
102. Cassese, "Foreign Economic Assistance and Respect for Civil and Political Rights: Chile-A Case
Study," 14 Tex. Int'l. L. J. 250, 262-3 (1979). See Fagen, ed., Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin
American Relations, Frenkel and O'Donnel, "The 'Stabilization Programs' of the IMF" 771 (1979).
103. Supra note 86.
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sion - by unionbusting, mass arrests, murder, torture, detention without charge
[and) . . .by allowing an 'acceptable' level of hunger and unemploy-
ment." 104
Some change in the International Financial Institutions policy has occurred
as evidenced by the fact that the directors now use criteria other than economic
factors. 105 They have also become more aware of the economic repercussions
of revolutions which are a result of serious violations of human rights. 10
6
2. Individual Foreign Relations
Other individual nations will undoubtedly be available to provide the money
and supplies required by the violating nation. If the individual nation does not
have the required goods itself, it can purchase and resell them to the violating
nation. It is common practice to circumvent an embargo by buying through
a satellite or other smaller country. "As one expert remarked (recently),
'If all the computers shipped to Vienna were really there, the city would
sink.' "107
Two examples relating to Argentina illustrate this point. In the Allis-Chalmers
case, one day after the Letter of Interest was denied by the Export-Import
Bank, Allis-Chalmers was notified by Japan and Great Britian that their
respective government export banks would provide comparable financing for
the right to supply the same equipment from their countries. 108 A second
example is seen in the area of military equipment. Shortly after military sales
were prohibited by the United States to Argentina the Soviet Union and
France began selling to Argentina. 109
CONCLUSION
Foreign assistance to Argentina has been cut because of human rights
violations. However, there is no clear indication that this withdrawal of aid
has had any effect on the human rights policies of Argentina. Rather than
harming Argentina, the sanctions have caused a deterioration in bilateral
relations and some loss of profit to the American business community.
The reason the sanctions have not been effective as leverage against
Argentina is that the funds, business and required goods are available elsewhere.
104. International Development Institutions Authorizations-1977: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977) (remarks by Rep. Thomas Harkin).
105. Other considerations include information given on persons missing in action 22 U.S.C. § 262d (Supp.
I 1977). See Marmorstein, "World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions,"
13 J. Int'l. L. & Econ. 113 (1978) [hereinafter cited as World Bank Decisions]; Loescher, "U.S.
Human Rights Policy and International Financial Institutions," 33 World Today 453 (1977); Schacter,
"International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies," 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 76, 85-7
(1978); Latin America Hearings, supra note 11, at 110.
106. World Bank Decisions, supra note 103, at 117.
107. "Grain Becomes a Weapon," 115 Time 12, 22, January 21, 1980.
108. Supra note 54, and Latin America Hearings, supra note 11.
109. "The U.S. and Latin America: The Challenge of Human Rights," 76 Current Hist. 49, 87 (1979).
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There are three sources which supply Argentina. The United States government
itself continues to provide aid either through programs not governed by human
rights sanctions or through loopholes created by discretionery provisions in the
statutes. The United States business community through its transnational
corporations, banks and export-import relations also continues relations with
Argentina. Other nations, both individually and through multilateral institutions,
provide funds and supplies not available from the United States.
Even if Congress were to pass more comprehensive or more stringent
legislation, some of the problems discussed would remain as factors inhibiting
the effectiveness of the human rights sanctions. Inherent in the fact that the
United States is a democracy and a capitalist society is the consequence that
the government does not have complete control over the business dealings of
its private citizens.
The immediate conclusion seems to follow that the sanctions should be
stopped. However, this note has dealt only with the limited aspect of sanctions
as leverage and those only as applied to non-dependent nations. The sanctions
serve other functions. As mentioned before, the most obvious function is to
disassociate the United States from the violating nation. The human rights
sanctions are also used by the State Department in discussions with the leaders
of violating countries as a rationale for otherwise diplomatically difficult
discussions. Finally, the human rights sanctions have served an important
function in providing hope to the individuals who have personally suffered
imprisonment and torture under the violating government.
Gracia Berg
B.A. Augsburg College, 1967; Diploma, Institut Internationale des Droits de L'Homme,
1979; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1980.
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